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NOTES ON THE RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES IN NEW YORK
MAURmCE FNKLsTEiN t
THE hazard of preparing a will in New York has been con-
tinually decreasing since Gray noted it in 1914.1  The
early multiplication of decisions wore itself out, as principles
became settled and juristic arithmetic was checked and re-
checked. 2 It ought to be possible now for law students, who
have pursued the prescribed course, to draft a testator's
wishes with comparative safety.
The rule, of course, must be developed by statements of
increasing complexity.
The suspension of the absolute ownership of personalty,
or of the power of alienation of realty, or the postponement
of vesting of future interests-any one of these will render
a provision in a will or deed void, if the suspension or post-
ponement of vesting is for more than two lives in being at
the creation of the estate.
The questions raised by this simple statement always
involve careful calculation. But given the care, the sums
must ever be right.
It has been found useful to treat the problem as if there
were here involved a simple series of answers to four specific
questions. And it is from that point of view that the rule
is easiest taught and learned. To each will or deed, this
formula must be rigidly applied.
t Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
IGRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITTES § 750 (3d ed. 1915).
2 This trend has been previously noted by the writer in the pages of this
REvimv. See Finkelstein, Notes on the New York Rule Against Simpension
of the Power of Alienation, 5 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1 (1930). But the fourth
edition of Gray's book, edited by Roland Gray, repeats unchanged Gray's orig-
inal dictum. See GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 750 (4th ed.
1942).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Question No. 1: Is there a suspension of the power of
alienation of real property or of the absolute ownership of
personalty? 3
The answer to this question can be seen at a glance. If
there are no gifts to unborn persons and no trusts to receive
and apply income, there is no suspension. If such be the
case, the statutory rule, as far as Section 42 of the Real
Property Law and Section 11 of the Personal Property Law
are concerned, does not apply, and all goes well. 4
The above is so obvious as to require but little comment.
Since the statute itself defines the term "suspension" as the
absence of persons in being who can convey a fee, the fact
that all of the donees are in being negates the possibility of
suspension.5
3 The statutes involved are Section 11 of the New York Personal Prop-
erty Law and Section 42 of the New York Real Property Law.
4 Of course, there still is the rule against remoteness of vesting (discussed
here under Question No. 3 and Question No. 4). This rule is said by Chaplin
to derive from the statute. He admits, however, that this is only an inference.
See CHAPLIN, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION § 369 (3d ed. 1928).
The opposite view has been taken by the writer. See Finkelstein, supra note 2.
See also Canfield, The New York Revised Statutes and the Rule Against
Perpetuities, 1 COL. L. REv. 224 (1901); Fowler, The Modern Law of Real
Property in New York, 1 COL. L. REv. 165 (1901); Whiteside, Suspension of
the Power of Alienation in New York, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 31, 167 (1927-28).
5 As to personal property, the definition of "suspension" is adapted from
the Real Property Law. -But in both real and personal property, a practical
obstacle may arise where a gift is to a class so large as to work a practical,
if not a theoretical, suspension. Thus, a gift to A for life, remainder to those
who Will be native or naturalized citizens of the United States at A's death,
would doubtless create obstacles to the conveyance of a fee, although theo-
retically all members of the class could join in the deed. But the possibility
of such eccentric wills has not been here considered. See GRAY, RULE AGAINST
PERPETurrIEs §§ 189, 190 (3d ed. 1915). Moreover, the statute merely requires
that there be "persons in being who can convey a fee"; not that they should
be practically in a position to do so. At common law, the multiplication of
"lives in being" did not affect the application of the rule. Thelluson v. Wood-
ford, 11 Ves. 112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1805).
The rule applies also to powers of appointment. The date of the creation
of such powers controls the validity of what is done under them rather than
the date of the exercise of the power. N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 178. The
section is also applied to personal property. Matter of Moehring, 154 N. Y.
423, 48 N. E. 818 (1897) ; Williams v. Montgomery, 148 N. Y. 519, 43 N. E.
57 (1896). Of course, the exercise of the power itself may be prohibited, if
its exercise may be postponed beyond the statutory period. Matter of Fischer,
181 Misc. 1044, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 649 (Surr. Ct. 1943). Sometimes, ingenious
judicial construction will save an invalid exercise of a power. Duff v. Roden-
kirchen, 110 Misc. 575, 182 N. Y. Supp. 35 (Sup. Ct. 1920). It seems some-
what difficult to check the judicial arithmetic indulged in by Judge Lehman in
this case.
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The addition to the above is the judicial determination,
not required by the words of the statute, that the creation
of a trust to receive and apply income is a suspension both
of ownership and of the power of alienation.6  Hence, the
rule that the presence of a trust as well as of a gift to unborn
persons creates a suspension.
Question No. 2: Will the suspension endure for more
than two specified lives in being at the creation of the estate
or at the death of the testator? 7
In answer to this question, some propositions emerge
clearly: (1) A gift to the unborn child of a person in being
is always valid. (2) A gift to the unborn child of unborn
parents is always invalid.8 In the first case, the "suspen-
sion" will come to an end within a life in being. In the
second case, it may not.
Likewise, in the matter of trusts, the "suspension" is
valid if the trust will end within two specified lives in being;
otherwise, it is invalid. The measurement of the duration
of trusts, however, is somewhat complicated by three doc-
trines: 9 (a) The doctrine of separable trusts; (b) the doc-
trine of judicial surgery; and (c) the doctrine of adminis-
trative trusts.
(a) The doctrine of separable trusts has an evolving
history. If A creates a trust to pay the income to B, C and
D for their respective lives, and upon the death of each, one-
1 Not all trusts suspend the power of alienation. Only such trusts as may
be said to require the holding of property in trust, against the Will of the
parties, create suspension. Thus, trusts which are revokable either by their
terms [Robert v. Corning, 89 N. Y. 225 (1882)], or by statute [N. Y. PFas.
PROP. LAW § 23; N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 118], do not work a suspension.
7 This changes the common law rule which merely required contingent
interests to vest within lives in being and 21 years. No such minority period
is contained in the New York statutes, except that a contingent remainder in
fee may be created if a prior vested remainder in fee is given to one who dies
under the age of 21. It is the absence of the 21-year term from the New
York statutes that makes all suspensions for a fixed term, no matter how
short, void. Matter of Hitchcock, 222 N. Y. 57, 118 N. E. 220 (1917); Kalish
v. Kalish, 166 N. Y. 368, 59 N. E. 917 (1901).
8 This is, of course, not unlike the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell, 44 Ch. D.
85 (1887), at common law, said by some to be independent of the rule against
perpetuities. See GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETriJTiES, Appendix K, 643
et seq. (3d ed. 1915).
9 The use of the word "doctrine" is arbitrary. These are more literally
canons of construction.
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third of the corpus to X, the trust is valid, since the court
sees here not one trust for three lives but three'trusts, each
for one life.
Sometimes, of course, the separation is not so clear; as
where A creates a trust to pay the income to B, C and D for
life "and upon their death corpus to X." If the testator
meant that the trust was to continue until B, C and D are
dead, and that until then no part of the corpus was to go to
X, the suspension would obviously be for three lives. But
if (and the courts would incline to that construction) the
testator meant that upon the death of each beneficiary, one-
third of the corpus would go to X, then the trust is obviously
separable, and divisible into three trusts, as in the first
instance.'0
The desire to uphold rather than to invalidate a deed
or will-ever present in the judicial breast "'-leads to un-
restrained efforts to find a severing intent in the mind of
the testator or settlor. But this has not always been pos-
sible, as Matter of Horner 12 and Matter of Trevor 13 have
long ago shown.
(b) The doctrine of judicial surgery has helped to vali-
date many otherwise faulty testaments. Joined to the doc-
trine of separable trusts, it forms a formidable weapon in
the hands of the courts to effectuate testators' intentions.
Primarily, one is concerned with deciding whether or not
the testator would have retained the valid portion of his will
had he known that the invalid portion would be excised. 4
It is necessary, when applying judicial surgery, to find
a valid primary gift, fully separate and apart from the in-
valid portion to be excised.' 5 This is clear when the invalid
1o An optimistic testatrix left her property in trust till the death of the
survivor of her five daughters. It took only a judicial sentence to render her
intestate. I, re Grace's Estate, 73 N. Y. S. 2d 200 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
"1 See, for example, validation of trust for fixed period of years, by reading
into the will the intention, not found therein, to terminate the trust on the
death of two life beneficiaries. In re Ayres' Will, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 897 (Surr.
Ct. 1947).
12.237 N. Y. 489, 143 N. E. 655 (1924).
Is 239 N. Y. 6, 145 N. E. 66 (1924).
14 For interesting examples, see In re Smith's Will, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 330
(Surr. Ct. 1947); In re Fuller's Will, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 498 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
-5 Matter of Naylor, 195 Misc. 775, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 336 (Surr. Ct. 1949).
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portion is found in a codicil, 6 or where a testator indulges
in the familiar practice of creating invalid cross remainders
in trust after carefully setting up valid trusts.17
Occasionally, one finds it difficult to reconcile the result
reached by the court with any supposed intent of the tes-
tator.'8 But the test is admittedly not one of law but of
judgment.' 9 Of necessity, we extrapolate into a realm of
darkness when we conclude that the testator would have re-
tained one part of a will had he known another would be
held invalid.
(c) The doctrine of administrative trusts is in reality
a method of upholding an otherwise invalid provision for a
period measured by the minority of a legatee. In these cases,
the trustees may be directed not to pay over the corpus after
the two lives until the recipient attains the age of 21. There
is nothing in the statute to justify upholding such a provi-
sion. But by treating the interest of the infant as vested
fully and completely, and the direction to withhold payment
as purely administrative, the courts have found a way to
validate the otherwise seemingly invalid provision. 20
Aside from the three doctrines already mentioned, there
are a few simple guides, which help to measure the duration
of trusts.
Thus, even a trust to endure for two lives will not be
upheld if one or both of them is or may not be in being at
the creation of the estate. A testator who dies leaving a
trust to pay the income to his unmarried daughter and her
husband for life, has failed of his purpose, for no matter
how old the daughter may be at his death, she may theoreti-
cally yet wed a man not in being.2 ' This can be avoided by
the insertion of a proviso that the husband be a person in
being. Probably the holding in these cases is often as un-
16 Matter of Eveland, 284 N. Y. 64, 29 N. E. 2d 471 (1940).
17 Matter of Lyons, 271 N. Y. 204, 2 N. E. 2d 628 (1936) ; see also cases
cited in notes 12 and 13 supra.
18 In re Geiger's Estate, 73 N. Y. S. 2d 196 (Surr. Ct. 1944).
19 See CHAPLIN, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 528-545.
20 See Matter of Eveland, 284 N. Y. 64, 29 N. E. 2d 471 (1940). See also
Note, 26 CoRxELL L. Q. 492 (1941).
21 Schettler v. Smith, 41 N. Y. 328 (1869).
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realistic as the refusal of the common law courts to recog-
nize that the possibility of issue has become extinct.22
Recently, the courts have upheld what in effect is a sus-
pension for more than two lives, where the lives in excess of
two are carved out, in a separate instrument, from a rever-
sion retained by the settlor or donor.2 8 The operation, how-
ever, requires careful draftsmanship. It is necessary that it
be clear that the settlor or testator reserves a reversion or
remainder within the definition of Section 39 of the Real
Property Law, as otherwise there will be no basis for up-
holding the second disposition.24
It does not matter how many people share in the in-
come of a trust, provided it will terminate within the pre-
scribed period. A trust, therefore, to pay the income to A,
B and C, which will terminate when the first two die, is,
nevertheless, valid, although it is not known which two lives
will measure the duration of the trust.25 This may be con-
fusing at times and has in fact stumped at least one expert.28
One could carry on with a minute discussion of the many
forms this problem - the duration of trusts - takes. But
enough has been said to point the avenue of approach and
to outline the course of analysis.
Que8tiorn No. 3: Are there any contingent future in-
terests? Except where there are provisions for unborn per-
22 Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox 324, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (1787); In re Sayer's
Trusts, L. R. 6 Eq. 319 (1868). But see Cooper v. Laroche, 17 Ch. D. 368
(1881), which recognized that women past sixty years of age cannot bear
children. Speaking of the decision of Malins, V.C., in the last cited case,
Gray says: ". . . [T]here can be little doubt that Cooper v. Laroche must
be considered one of the not unfrequent blunders of that learned judge."
GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 215.1 (4th ed. 1942). This rule is
singled out for special condemnation in Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective:
Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 HAgv. L. Ray. 721, 732 (1952). This
rule, however, avoids the judicial burden of deciding the purely medical ques-
tion of childbearing age. Moreover, there is no limit on the age of foster
parents in the case of adoption. Of course, rights of adopted children are the
same as those of natural children. Gilliam v. Guaranty Trust Co., 186 N. Y.
127, 78 N. E. 697 (1906).2 3 New York Trust Co. v. Weaver, 298 N. Y. 1, 80 N. E. 2d 56 (1948).2 4 Guaranty Trust Co. v. N. Y. Trust Co., 297 N. Y. 45, 74 N. E. 2d 232
(1947).2 5 Meldon v. Devlin, 31 App. Div. 146, 53 N. Y. Supp. 172 (1st Dep't
1898), aff'd mein., 167 N. Y. 573, 60 N. E. 1116 (1901) ; In re Jarvie's Will,
73 N. Y. S. 2d 246 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
28 Niles, Future Interests, 23 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rav. 785, 791 (1948).
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sons, this may prove troublesome. Of course, gifts to unborn
persons are always contingent. On the other hand, gifts to
persons in being may also be contingent. Construction of
the instrument is all important.
The statute has not cleared up the difference between
vested and contingent future interests.2 7 Yet some proposi-
tions are settled.
A contingent interest arises out of one of three possi-
bilities: (1) Either the person who is to take is uncertain;
or (2) if he is an ascertained person, the event upon which
he is to take is uncertain; or (3) both. In the first case,
the uncertainty may derive from the fact that the donee is
an unborn person, or if a person in being, not yet ascer-
tained-as the oldest of my brothers living at the death of
my son.
Where the contingency is due to the fact that the donee
is unborn, there is also a suspension.28  Otherwise, since the
persons in being may unite to convey a fee, there is no
suspension.
Some lawyers think that Judge Woodruff, in Moore v.
Littel,29 stated a test for distinguishing between vested and
contingent future interests. But Chaplin 30 long ago ex-
posed this error, and the "point your finger" test, though
emphatically adopted by Judge Woodruff, has seldom been
followed.3 1
Gray thought that the common law tests to determine
whether a future interest is vested or contingent have been
changed in New York by statute.3 2  But he, himself, has
pointed to cases inconsistent with this view,33 and allowed
the possibility of the Chaplin view that the common law test
still prevails.3 4
27 N. Y. REAL PRop. LAW § 40.
28 See supra p. 247.
2941 N. Y. 66 (1869).
30 CHAPLIN, op. Clt. supra note 4, §§ 571 et seq.
32 Hennessy v. Patterson, 85 N. Y. 91 (1881); Hall v. La France Fire
Engine Co., 158 N. Y. 570, 53 N. E. 513 (1899); Walker v. Marcellus & 0. L.
Ry., 226 N. Y. 347, 123 N. E. 736 (1919).
32 GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PaPETrUITIS § 107 (4th ed. 1942).3 3 Id. at 93, n. 2.34 Id. at 93, n. 4.
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We, therefore, conclude that the answer to Question
No. 3 is as follows:
(1) All gifts to unborn persons are contingent. But
since such gifts also suspend the power of alienation, the
fact of their contingency is immaterial.
(2) If the person to whom and the event upon which
are both uncertain, the gift is contingent. Thus, a gift to
A for life, remainder to A's children, but if he die without
issue, to the youngest of the testator's brothers then living,
the gift to the brother is clearly contingent.
(3) Where the person, though in being, is uncertain,
the gift is contingent; as where the gift is to A for life, re-
mainder in fee to the youngest of my brothers living at A's
death.
(4) Where only the event is uncertain, the test is one
of language. Thus, a gift to A for life, remainder to B, but
if A die leaving issue, to such issue, creates a vested remain-
der in B, subject to being divested. But a gift to A for life,
remainder to such of his issue as survive him, and in default
of such issue to B, creates a contingent remainder in B.3 5
Now, if it is determined that the provisions under re-
view are vested or vested subject to being divested, they are
valid, and one need go no further. But if there are any con-
tingent future interests, we come to
Question No. 4: When, if at all, will the contingent
future interests vest? If the vesting must take place, if at
all, within the statutory period, the future interest is valid;
otherwise void. Here, it is necessary to remember that we
look at the state of affairs at the creation of the estate. Thus,
a gift to Frances for life, followed by invalid trusts to her
children, but if she die childless to Charles and Maria, cre-
ates a contingent future interest in Charles and Maria which,
viewed at the date of the testator's death, may not vest with-
in two lives. Hence, the gift over to Charles and Maria is
bad, even though in fact Frances never had any children. 6
35 Id. § 108.
6atter of Wilcox, 194 N. Y. 288, 87 N. E. 497 (1909).
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The most troublesome questions which arise in this con-
nection concern gifts to a classA7 For in such cases, it
frequently happens that the members of the class are not
ascertained at the creation of the estate. The problems are
largely of construction-the eternal hunt for the elusive in-
tent of the testator. The problem is to ascertain if the gift
is to remain contingent until the class is closed, or if it is
to vest prior thereto either finally or subject to whole or
partial divestment.38
If the class is closed within the statutory period, the gift
to the class is valid. If the class remains open beyond the
statutory period, the gift is void.39 If the class is finally
closed within the statutory period, it does not matter that
before it is closed members thereof may come into or fall
37 See definition quoted from Jarman in Matter of Kimberly, 150 N. Y. 90,
93, 44 N. E. 945, 946 (1896).
38 Rules as to dates of closing of classes may be summarized as follows:
(a) Gift to children of A-only those children of A in being can take.
(b) But if at time gift takes effect A has no children, then all afterborn
children take as per intention of testator.
(c) Gift to A for life, remainder to B's children-all children of B in
being at A's death take.
(d) But in last cited instance, if B has no children at death of A, all chil-
dren of B take as per intention of testator.
(e) To A for life, remainder to children of B who attain 21, class closes
at death of A if at that time there are children of B in being who
have attained 21; if not, class closes when first child of B to attain
21, does so.
(f) All above rules subject to caveat that expressed intention of testator
is not to the contrary.
See In re Chartres [1927] 1 Ch. 466, 471. But if gift is to A for life and in
default of appointment by A "to heirs of testator," class includes only those
who would be members at death of testator. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v.
Callan, 246 N. Y. 481, 159 N. E. 405 (1927).
39 Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Callan, 246 N. Y. 481, 159 N. E. 405
(1927); Matter of Smith, 131 N. Y. 239, 30 N. E. 130 (1892); Gilliam v.
Guaranty Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 127, 78 N. E. 697 (1906). In such cases, a
member of the class does not take a vested interest, but his interest may be
defeated by his death before class is closed. New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Winthrop, 237 N. Y. 93, 142 N. E. 431 (1923). Unless the will fixes the date
for determination of class membership. Matter of King, 200 N. Y. 189, 93
N. E. 484 (1910). Membership in a class fixed on date of vesting. Matter
of Allen, 151 N. Y. 243, 45 N. E. 554 (1896); Matter of Hoffman, 201 N. Y.
247, 94 N. E. 990 (1911). Vesting may be disturbed on one alternative, as
when member of class dies before distribution, but not on another, as when
member dies without issue, Bowditch v. Ayrault, 138 N. Y. 222, 34 N. E. 514
(1893).
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out of it, or even do so conditionally.40 The stress is on the
time within which the class remains open for admission of
new members or the exclusion of old.
Many situations, of course, will arise which may require
nicer analysis, but the basis of the calculation has been
stated. It may be necessary to work a problem to the nth
power, and the absence of juristic comptometers or slide
rules often makes the going tough. But through precision
and care, accuracy will emerge.
40 Ibid. Sometimes the courts will excise an invalid provision for divestment.
See Henderson v. Henderson, 113 N. Y. 1, 20 N. E. 814 (1889).
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